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SALES WARRANTIES IN ILLINOIS: COMMERCIAL CODE
AND PRE-CODE LAW
GEORGE J. SCHAFFER*
THE UNIFORM SALES ACT was approved by the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1906 and
adopted in Illinois on June 29, 1915. Other parts of Illinois com-
mercial law are equally antiquated. Thus the need for a modern
code of commercial law to govern commercial transactions in an
industrial state such as Illinois in 1962 should be obvious. The
Uniform Commercial Code, as adopted in Illinois,' (hereinafter
referred to as the Code), does modernize Illinois commercial law;
of particular concern for our purpose is the replacement of the
Uniform Sales Act,2 (hereinafter referred to as the Sales Act), with
Article 2 of the Code and the changes it effected in warranty law in
sales transactions. Although most of the substance of the Sales Act
has been incorporated into Article 2 of the Code, it has been com-
pletely rewritten with numerous revisions and many new provi-
sions. The law of warranty, among others, is revised and improved
and should provide greater purchaser protection in sales trans-
actions under Illinois commercial law.3
The purpose of this article is to compare the law of sales war-
ranties in Illinois, under the Sales Act, with the rules of warranty
law that might reasonably be expected to prevail after the Code
* LL.B. 1954, Chicago-Kent College of Law; Ph.B. 1959, Northwestern University.
Associate Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law.
I Enacted as (S.B. 198), Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 26, Commercial Code, by the Illionis
Legislature in 1961; signed by the governor July 31, 1961; and effective July 1, 1962.
2 I11. Rev. Stat. ch. 121 1/2, §§ 1-77.
3 For a comparison under Pennsylvania Law, see Note, "Legislation," 15 U. Pitt.
L. Rev. 331 (1953-1954); for Kentucky, see Notes, "The Uniform Commercial Code and
Greater Consumer Protection Under Warranty Law," 49 Ky. L.J. 240 (1960-1961).
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becomes effective, and comment on such changes in Illinois war-
ranty law of sales.4 The following comparison between Code and
pre-Code warranty law in sales transactions in Illinois is divided
into four main catagories: (1) warranties in general, (2) express
warranties, (3) implied warranties, and (4) disclaimer of warran-
ties.5
WARRANTIES IN GENERAL
The warranty obligation is one of the most important parts
of a contract of sale and a large portion of sales litigation arises
from it. Such warranty obligations may be divided into three
classes: express, implied, and statutory.7 In the Sales Act, the legis-
lature categorized warranties as express or implied. The implied
warranty of title of the Sales Act8 becomes, under the Code,9 a
4 Eighteen jurisdictions have now adopted the Uniform Commercial Code, including
New York, McKinney's Uniform Commercial Code, §§ 1-101 to 10-105; and Michigan,
Comp. Laws Supp. §§ 1101-9994. However, the effective date in Michigan is delayed
until January 1, 1964, and in New York until September 27, 1964.
5 Note that section numbers and the wording of the sections on warranty law of
the Illinois Commercial Code and the Uniform Commercial Code are identical. Cita-
tions to the Illinois Commercial Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 26) will be cited as "I.C.C."
Citations to the Illinois Sales Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 121 ) will be cited as "I.S.A."
Citations to the Official Comments of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1958 draft, will be
cited as "U.C.C. Off. Com. point #."
6 Vold gives a "Rough Definition of Seller's Warranty" as:
"A seller's warranty in connection with a contract to sell or a sale of goods
is an obligation, incidental to the deal. Under it the seller becomes answer-
able for various matters relating to the goods. . . . It may arise from the
terms of the seller's actual promises, express or implied in fact. . . . The
seller's warranty obligation thus may be either promissory in nature, or inde-
pendently imposed by law, or both. A convenient figure of speech in which
to describe its possible triple nature is to call it a three-pronged type of
obligation: prong no. 1, the promissory warranty, is strictly contractual; prong
no. 2, the warranty obligation is based on the seller's representations inducing
the deal, is independently imposed by law, comparable to tort obligations;
prong no. 3, also is independently imposed by law, apart from the seller's
representations, for strictly public policy reasons."
Vold, Law of Sales (2d ed., 1959).
7 According to Williston:
"There is no more troublesome word in the law than the word warranty . ..
In the law of sales in England * meaning is given to warranty: namely, an
agreement with reference to goods which are the subject of a contract of sale
but collateral to the main purpose of such contract, the breach of which gives
rise to a claim for damages ....
"The variety of meaning attached to the word warranty is a source of confusion,
and it is obviously a service to the law to limit the word to one meaning.
Accordingly in the Sales Act the word is limited to what is probably its
essential meaning-a material promise, or a material affirmation from which
a contractual or quasi-contractual obligation may be implied."
8 I.S.A. § 13.
9 I.C.C. § 2-312.
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statutory express warranty, thus introducing all three types of war-
ranties as named above into Illinois sales law.' 0
Definition
Illinois and federal courts interpreting Illinois sales law define
a "warranty" arising from a contract of sale, as a promise of agree-
ment by the seller that the article sold has certain qualities, or that
the seller has good title thereto." An express warranty is one im-
posed by the parties to the contract and is a part of the contract of
sale,12 whereas an implied warranty is not one of the contractual
elements of the sale but is, instead, imposed by law. 13
This definition confirms section 12 of the Sales Act which de-
fines an express warranty as "any affirmation of fact, or any promise
by the seller relating to the goods," and recognizes that such ex-
press warranty, as well as a warranty implied by law, becomes a
part of the seller's obligation in a contract of sale. Express warran-
ties arise, therefore, out of the facts of negotiation, 4 and implied
warranties depend on conditions rather than negotiations for their
existence.' 5
The Code does not change this basic warranty obligation con-
cept in Illinois law. On the contrary, the Code consolidates and
systematizes basic principles of warranty law with the result that
express warranties rest on "dickered" aspects of the individual bar-
gain, and go so clearly to the essence of that bargain that words of
disclaimer in a form are repugnant to the basic terms. Implied war-
ranties on the other hand, rest so clearly on a common factual situa-
tion or set of conditions that no particular language of action is
necessary to evidence them and they will arise in such a situation
unless unmistakenly negated.' 6
10 This fact is significant when viewed in relation to Code § 2-316 which provides
for the exclusion of implied warranties only. Code § 2-312, warranty of title and against
infringement, contains within itself in sub-sections (2) and (3) specific procedures for
disclaiming or modifying these warranties.
"1 Chanin v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 15 F. Supp. 57 (N.D. Ill. 1935), aff'd, 89 F.2d 889
(7th Cir., 1937).
12 Paul Harris Furniture Co. v. Morse, 10 Ill. 2d 28, 139 N.E.2d 275 (1956).
13 Beckett v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 376 Ill. 470, 34 N.E.2d 427 (1941).
14 Paul Harris Furniture Co. v. Morse, supra n.12.
15 Beckett v. F. W. Woolworth Co., supra n.13.
16 U.C.C. Off. Com. 2-313 point 1.
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Nature and Validity
A warranty is said to be contractual in nature and implies an
agreement to indemnify or make payment of money to the vendee
in case of a breach. 7 It is an incident to a contract of sale and as-
sumes, or necessarily implies, the existence of a contract, although
it is not an essential element of a sale.'8 Both the Code and Sales
Act provide remedies for the buyer in case of a breach of warranty
by the seller,' 9 and allow the exclusion of implied warranty obliga-
tions.20 Hence they are in accord with the above statement. With
respect to the attitude of the courts, in the recent case of Carolet
Corp. v. Garfield,21 brought under the Code in the State of Massa-
chusetts, the court said: "In more recent times the general course
of decision has been to treat express warranties as contracts of in-
demnity rather than as representations, unless a recovery in tort
for deceit is specifically sought."
Relative to the question of validity of a warranty, Illinois pre-
Code law requires that the warranty be made at the time of the sale
or, if made afterward, that it be based on a new consideration.22 On
this question an important change is made in Illinois warranty law
by the Code. Technicalities which at present hamper adjustment
of a sales contract after the bargain has been made will no longer
be controlling. The Code seeks to protect and make effective all
necessary and desirable modifications of sales contracts without re-
gard to such technicalities, (such as consideration) which at present
hamper such adjustments. Code section 2-209 provides:
"(1) An agreement modifying a contract within this ar-
ticle needs no consideration to be binding ... "
In addition to modification of a contract of sale by express agree-
ment without consideration, modification under the Code may be
established by a course of conduct,23 subject, however, to the re-
quirements of Code section 2-209(2) and (3).
17 Dewar v. Loy, 248 Ill. App. 396 (1927).
18 Sterling-Midland Coal Co. v. Great Lakes Coal & Coke Co., 334 Ill. 281, 165
N.E. 793 (1929).
19 I.S.A. § 69; I.C.C. §§ 2-713, 2-714, 2-715.
20 I.S.A. § 71; I.C.C. § 2-316.
21 339 Mass. 75, 157 N.E.2d 876 (1959).
22 Towell & Towell v, Gatewood, 3 Ill. 22 (1839).
23 I.C.C. § 2-208.
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This may appear to open the door and allow unscrupulous
people to extort modification of their contracts, or permit fraud
and economic duress through the enforcement of a modified agree-
ment not supported by consideration. However, Code section 2-
209(2) specifies a procedure for modification or rescission of a writ-
ten agreement,24 and section 2-209(3) makes operative the Statute
of Frauds of the Sales Article25 applicable to the revisions of con-
tracts. Since modifications made under section 2-209 must meet the
test of good faith imposed by the Code,26 the extortion of modifica-
tion of a contract of sale without legitimate commercial reason will
be a violation of the duty of good faith of the Code.27
Parties
Under Pre-Code Illinois law, in order for one to be liable on
a warranty, it must be either his contract or that of his authorized
agent, or he must have ratified a contract of warranty in a contract
of sale wherein he is the seller.28 Further, a warranty is addressed
to some particular person, generally the buyer, who alone can avail
himself thereof.2 9 Privity of contract, therefore, is generally re-
quired between the warrantor and the person seeking recovery,80
although it is not of necessity confined to the person to whom title
has been transferred.8 1
The Sales Act does not specify whether a seller's warranties run
to third parties. The Code, however, makes a limited change in the
rule of privity of contract between the injured person and the
seller 32 by eliminating the need for privity of contract in the case
of any natural person 33 who is in the family or household of his
24 I.C.C. § 2-209(2) provides: "A signed agreement which excludes modification or
rescission except by a signed writing cannot be otherwise modified or rescinded, but
except as between merchants such a requirement on a form supplied by the merchant
must be separately signed by the other party."
25 I.C.C. § 2-201.
26 I.C.C. § 1-203.
27 I.C.C. § 2-103(b) defines "good faith" as follows: "'Good Faith' in the case of
a merchant means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial stand-
ards of fair dealing in the trade."
28 Illinois Moulding Co. v. Page & Lyon Mfg. Co., 104 Ill. App. 1 (1902).
29 Phillips v. Vermillion, 91 111. App. 133 (1900).
30 Chanin v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 89 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1937).
31 Lindroth v. Walgreen Co., 329 Ill. App. 105, 67 N.E.2d 595 (1946).
32 I.C.C. § 2-318.
33 Facciolo Paving and Construction Co. v. Road Machinery, Inc., 8 Pa. Chest. 375
(1958) (plaintiff corporation, successor to an individual purchaser of a machine from
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buyer, 4 or who is a guest in his home,3 5 if it is reasonable to expect
that such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and
who is injured in his person by breach of the warranty." Query:
is the guest in the home still protected when the family and guest
have departed from the host's home and are now at the picnic
grounds when the breach of warranty causes the injury?
As to the vendee's vendee, the Code takes a neutral position
and does not extend the provisions of Code section 2-318 to in-
clude him.3 7 This continues existing Illinois case law under the
Sales Act in which a sub-vendee cannot act directly against an
original vendor because of the lack of privity of contract.3 8 Ex-
ceptions to the rule of requirement of privity of contract between
the injured person and the seller under the Code, (and continuing
pre-Code law on this subject) are generally based on tort;3 9 for
tort remedies as well as remedies for breach of warranty are avail-
able based on the same set of circumstances under both pre-Code
and Code law.40 Certainly the tort aspect of products liability
should not be overlooked in Illinois cases as a means of avoiding
the privity of contract rule when recovery is sought for injury
caused by breach of warranty by a person other than the buyer,4
as well as the effect of statements made in advertising42 as origina-
defendant seller not a natural person within this section (2-318), not within group for
whose benefit warranties run).
34 Ibid. (Corporation neither a member of family or of household not within class
for whose benefit this section provides.)
35 Thompson v. Reedman, 199 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa. 1961) (automobile not a
"home" within this section (2-318) covering third party beneficiaries of warranties and
guest passenger in automobile not a statutory beneficiary).
36 Jacquot v. Win. Filene's Sons Co., 337 Mass. 315, 149 N.E.2d 635 (1958) (in action
of contract by buyer to recover for injuries caused by artificial fingernail kit purchased
from defendant, if the purchase was made by the buyer for her own account and not
as agent for her husband, he had no cause of action).
37 Facciolo Paving and Construction Co. v. Road Machinery, Inc., supra n.33. (even
though individual purchasers rights and liabilities in subject matter of contract were
assigned to plaintiff successor corporation, this section (2-318) does not change existing
case law which requires privity of contract between the parties in order to extend the
seller's warranties to other persons in the distributive chain).
38 Chanin v. Chevrolet Motor Co., supra n.30.
39 For a discussion of the rule of "privity of contract" and exceptions thereto as
developed in tort liability, see Prosser, Torts § 84 (2d ed. 1955); and Note, 46 Harv. L.
Rev. 161, 162 (1932).
40 Carolet Corp. v. Garfield, 339 Mass. 75, 157 N.E.2d 876 (1959).
41 Lack of privity did not preclude guest passenger in automobile from suing auto-
mobile dealer and manufacturer on theory of breach of warranty of merchantability and
fitness for use for injuries suffered when accelerator pedal of automobile stuck, causing
collision. Thompson v. Reedman, 199 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa. 1961),
42 Williston on Sales § 202 (Rev. Ed. 1948). "In the second place the statement may
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ting a direct warranty between the manufacturer and the con-
sumer.
4 3
The last sentence of Code section 2-318 may at first glance
seem to present a problem of disclaimer by the seller as to third
party beneficiaries of warranties in the provision. It reads: "A
seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section." How-
ever, an express warranty must first have been made by the seller
to the buyer, or implied warranties not negated, in order that a
third party benefit from them.44
With regard to foodstuffs and like goods designed for human
consumption, the requirement of privity of contract is not control-
ling in Illinois pre-Code law. 45 One purchasing food which is del-
eterious has a remedy against either the person from whom the
food was last purchased, or against a prior seller thereof,46 and
where an article of food or drink is sold in a sealed container for
human consumption, the warranty of wholesomeness and fitness
for human consumption runs with the sale of the article for the
benefit of the consumer thereof notwithstanding the absence of
privity of contract between the ultimate consumer and the manu-
facturer, packer or processor.47 The warranty of wholesomeness
arises, however, out of public policy as expressed in the pure food
statute of the state of Illinois.4 s
Under the Code the serving for value of food or drink to be
consumed on the premises or elsewhere is a sale, 9 thus rejecting
cases to the contrary in pre-Code Illinois law, which required that
such action be brought under the warranty of wholesomeness of
the Illinois Pure Food Act. 50 The principal implied warranty (mer-
chantability) is to be found in Code section 2-314(1) which pro-
be made in advertisements or in other public ways which are ordinarily to be treated as
efforts to induce further negotiations or purchases ... proper interpretation . . .questions
of degree."
43 Vold, Law of Sales § 93 (2d ed. 1959), discussing privity of warranty in f. 30: "This
is notably true where the ultimate consumer has relied on express representations found
in the manufacturer's labels or other advertising," and citations thereto.
44 U.C.C. Off. Com. § 2-318 point 1.
45 Haut v. Kleene, 320 Ill. App. 273, 50 N.E.2d 855 (1943).
46 Sharpe v. Danville Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 9 Ill. App. 2d 175, 132 N.E.2d 442 (1956).
47 Patargias v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, 332 Ill. App. 117, 74 N.E.2d 162
(1947).
48 Williams v. Paducah Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 343 Ill. App. 1, 98 N.E.2d 164 (1951).
49 I.C.C. § 2-314(1).
50 Williams v. Paducah Coca-Cola Bottling Co., supra n.48.
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vides: "Under this section the serving for value of food or drink to
be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale," and
sub-sections (2) (c) which provide: "are fit for the ordinary purpose
for which such goods are used"; but the warranty of merchanta-
bility is being extended, under the Code, to include the container
in which the goods are enclosed,"' even though it was said that
"there was no sale of the container but a mere lending thereof. ' 52
Other cases decided under the Code hold that privity of contract
is not necessary in cases of breach of warranty in the sale of food
for human consumption,53 continuing pre-Code law. The Code,
therefore gives an additional remedy for breach of warranty with
respect to the sale of food while continuing existing law relative to
privity of contract in cases where the sale of food is not involved.54
ExPREss WARRANTIES
Generally
The Sales Act, section 12, defines an express warranty as:
"Any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the
goods is an express warranty if the natural tendency of such affirm-
ation is to induce the buyer to purchase the goods, and if the buyer
purchases the goods relying thereon."
The essence of an express warranty under the Sales Act is that
such express warranty shall have (1) the "natural tendency to in-
duce the buyer to purchase the goods" and, (2) "the buyer must
rely on the warranty when, making the purchase." No particular
words or forms of expressions are necessary to create an express
warranty,55 and a positive assertion of a matter of fact made by the
seller at the time of the sale, for the purpose of assuring the buyer
of the fact and inducing him to make the purchase, if relied on by
the purchaser, constitutes a warranty.56 The express warranty as
thus defined becomes a part of the contract of sale.57
51 Hadley v. Hillcrest Dairy Inc., 341 Mass. 624, 171 N.E.2d 293 (1961).
52 Ibid.
53 Adams v. Scheib, 75 Pa. Dauph. 158 (1961) (the developing case law is the effect
that in cases involving food or other articles for human consumption a buyer's right of
action for breach of warranty is not restricted to his immediate seller).
54 Ibid. (Where the article in question is other than food, the buyer must show
privity of contract in order to maintain assumpsit against a remote vendor). For pre-Code
law, see Chanin v. Chevrolet Motor Co., supra n.30.
55 Beckett v. F. W. Woolworth Co., supra n.13.
56 Ibid.
57 Paul Harris Furniture Co. v. Morse, supra n.12.
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The Code emphasizes that express warranties are created by
the seller during the facts of negotiation, as contrasted with the
Sales Acts definition of an express warranty. However, both the
Sales Act and the Code are in general accord that the express war-
ranty consists of "any affirmation of fact or any promise relating to
the goods" which contributes to and is instrumental in concluding
the transaction. In addition, the Code expands the scope of express
warranties to include any description of the goods,"' and any model
or sample which is made part of the basis of the bargain by the
parties to the transaction.19 A language variation exists in Code
section 2-313(1) whereby clause (a) states, "promise . . . becomes
part of the basis of the bargain," whereas clauses (b) and (c) read
"description, sample or model ... is made part of the basis of the
bargain." This variation should not be significant since the essen-
tial fact is the agreement made by the parties and embraces the
element in question.
The expansion of the scope of express warranties in the Code
to include a warranty created by description, sample or model is
a realistic appraisal of the making of a contract of sale. A contract
is normally a contract for a sale of something describable and
described, and such description may take the form of models, sam-
ples and various types of technical descriptions such as blue prints
and specifications as well as mere words. Since the whole purpose
of the law of warranty is to determine what it is that the seller has
in essence agreed to sell, broadening the scope of express warranties
to include sale by description, model and sample should, in prac-
tice, neutralize a clause in a form generally disclaiming "all war-
ranties, express or implied." Such clause should not be given literal
effect by the courts so as to reduce the seller's obligation with re-
spect to such description under Code section 2-316. Although the
parties should be able to make their own bargain, in determining
what they agreed upon, good faith is a factor and consideration
should be given to the fact that the probability is small that a real
price is intended to be exchanged for a pseudo-obligation. 60
Illinois law provides no clear standards for determining when
a statement is one of fact amounting to a warranty, or is a state-
58 I.c.c. § 2-313(b).
59 Id., § 2-313(c).
60 U.C.C. Off. Com. 2-313 point 4.
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ment of an opinion, but both a pre-Code case decision 6l and the
Code are in accord that such formal words as "warrant" or "guar-
antee" are not necessary to the creation of an express warranty, nor
that the seller have a specific intention to make a warranty.62 Fur-
ther, no particular words or form of expression is necessary to cre-
ate an express warranty, 63 and a positive assertion of a matter of
fact made by the seller at the time of the sale, for the purpose of
assuring the buyer of the fact and inducing him to make the pur-
chase, if relied on by the purchaser, constitutes a warranty.64
In pre-Code law, whether there was an express warranty was
determined from the intent of the parties, as shown by the expres-
sions or words used in the contract, and the meaning to be given
to them,65 in accordance with the rules applicable to the construc-
tion of contracts generally.66 Section 12 of the Sales Act provides
that "no affirmation of the value of the goods, nor any statement
purporting to be a statement of the seller's opinion only shall be
construed as a warranty." 61 Thus, where a representation as to the
goods sold is positive and relates to a matter of fact, it constitutes
a warranty; but where the representation relates to that which is
merely a matter of opinion, it does not constitute a warranty.68 In
determining whether affirmations or representations constitute a
warranty or a statement of the seller's opinion or judgment, it has
been stated that a decisive test is whether the seller assumes to as-
sert a fact of which the buyer is ignorant, or merely states an opin-
ion or judgment on a matter of which the seller special knowledge,
and on which the buyer may be expected to have an opinion and to
exercise his judgment.6 9
Concerning affirmations of value or a seller's opinion or com-
mendation, the basic question remains the same under the Code:
"what statements of the seller have, in the circumstances and in
objective judgment, become part of the basis of the bargain?"
61 Beckett v. F. W. Woolworth Co., supra n.13.
62 I.C.C. § 2-313(2).
63 Pre-Code law, Beckett v. F. W. Woolworth Co., supra n.13; I.C.C. § 2-313(2).
64 Beckwith v. F. W. Woolworth Co., supra n.13.
65 MacAndrews & Forbes Co. v. Mechanical Mfg. Co., 367 Ill. 288, 11 N.E.2d 382
(1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 655 (1938).
66 Ibid.
67 Beckett v. F. W. Woolworth Co., supra n.13.
68 Able Transfer Co. v. William E. Dee Co., 192 Ill. App. 14 (1915).
69 Keller v. Flynn, 346 Ill. App. 499, 105 N.E.2d 532 (1952).
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The expanded scope of express warranties to include sale by de-
scription, models, and samples, should have little effect when re-
lated to persons who have nearly equal knowledge and deal at arm's
length. However, when the circumstances are such that the buyer,
as a reasonable man, is entitled to rely on the seller's opinion or
commendation, as when the seller has superior knowledge of the
subject matter, such statement should become a part of the basis
of the bargain. Even as to false statements of value the possibility
may be left open to a remedy by law relating to fraud or misrepre-
sentation.70
Under pre-Code law, the fact that an article has a trade name
does not preclude the retailer selling it from making an express
warranty relative to such goods;7 and when there is an express
warranty, a buyer is not required to inspect the goods,72 at the time
of the sale. The Code should not change these rules. Code section
2-313(1) states that express warranties are created by:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or any promise made by the
seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and be-
comes part of the basis of the bargain creates an ex-
press warranty that the goods shall conform to the
affirmation or promise.
Subsections (b) and (c) treat any description, and any model
or sample in a like manner. Therefore, trade name articles will
continue to be the subject of express warranties under appropriate
circumstances. As for the exclusion of a warranty by inspection of
the goods by the buyer, no valid reason exists why a buyer need
examine the goods where an express warranty exists. However,
lacking such an express warranty, and the opportunity to inspect
the goods, good business sense should dictate that such an inspec-
tion should be made. The Code, therefore provides for the exclu-
sion of implied warranties where the opportunity for an inspection
is available and such inspection is made or should have been made
by the buyer.73
70 U.C.C. Off. Corn. § 2-313, point 8.
71 Beckett v. F. W. Woolworth Co., supra n.13.
72 Standard Oil. Co. of Ind. v. Daniel Burkhartmeier Cooperage Co., 333 Ill. App.
338, 77 N.E.2d 526 (1948).
73 I.C.C. § 2-316(3)(b); Ehert Brewery v. Lebanon Valley Brewing Co., 5 Pa. Lebanon
125 (1955).
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Under pre-Code law, a seller of property may, by disclaimer,
refuse to warrant the property sold, but the disclaimer is ineffectual
if it is made after the contract is concluded, unless the buyer assents
to the change.74 Under the Code the precise time when words of
description or affirmation are made, or samples shown so as to
create an express warranty, is no longer material. The sole ques-
tion is whether the language, samples, or models, are fairly to be
regarded as part of the contract. If such language is used, or an act
occurs after the closing of the transaction, the warranty becomes a
modification and need not be supported by consideration if it is
otherwise reasonable and in order.75 A like treatment should be
accorded a similar act of disclaimer of warranty by the seller if
the test of good faith is met.
Nor is it objectionable under the Sales Act,7" as well as the
Code, that more than one warranty may exist concurrently. Code
section 2-317 provides:
Warranties, whether express or implied, shall be con-
strued as consistent with each other and cumulative, but
if such construction is unreasonable the intention of the
parties shall determine which warranty is dominant.
Additional evidence of protection built into the Code to protect
purchasers in sales transactions through the medium of warranties
is to be found in Code section 2-316 which provides:
(1) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an ex-
press warranty and words and conduct tending to
negate or limit warranty shall be construed when-
ever reasonable as consistent with each other; but sub-
ject to the provisions of this Article on parol or ex-
trinsic evidence (section 2-202) negation or limitation
is inoperative to the extent that such construction is
unreasonable.
Thus the basic policy of the Code is to recognize that no warranty
is created except by some conduct, either affirmative action or fail-
74 Keller v. Flynn, supra n.69
75 I.C.C. § 2-209. Rescission: Hassett v. Peterson, 16 Mass. App. Dec. 24 (1958).
Modification: Gateway Co. v. Charlotte Theatres, Inc., 297 F.2d 483 (lst Cir. 1962).
76 I.S.A. § 15(6).
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ure to disclose, on the part of the seller. Therefore, all warranties
under the Code are made cumulative unless this construction of
the contract is unreasonable. 77 Where doubt exists as to which war-
ranty was intended to be dominant, a series of rules are provided
in section 2-317(a), (b), and (c) to aid in making such determina-
tion.7 1
Sale by Description
The common law rule, re-enacted by section 14 of the Sales
Act, is that in a contract to sell or a sale by description there is an
implied warranty that the goods will correspond with the descrip-
tion.79 The warranty applied where the goods are not presently on
hand or in existence, and are sold by description, and is designed
to insure delivery to the purchaser of those goods which he agreed to
buy, and of necessity applies only to cases where the specific article
bought was either not in existence or not on hand at the time and
place of the sale. 0
The mere use, in pre-Code law, of descriptive terms in the
sale contract is not operative to bring into existence the warranties
arising from a sale by description where the sale is not such as to
constitute a sale by description. An example is where the subject
matter of the sale is determined by independent means not con-
nected with the description, and the latter is only incidently in-
serted for purposes of identification, or where the transfer of title
is directly conditioned on the goods answering the description in-
stead of being collaterally related."' A sale by trade name is not a
sale by description in pre-Code law.82
Warranties arising from a sale by description in Illinois law
under section 14 of the Sales Act are implied warranties, whereas
77 U.C.C. Off. Com. § 2-317 point 1.
78 I.C.C. § 2-317 provides:
"(a) Exact or technical specifications displace an inconsistent sample or model or
general language of description.
"(b) A sample from an existing bulk displaces inconsistent general language of
description.
"(c) Express warranties displace inconsistent implied warranties other than an
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose."
79 Grass v. Steinberg, 331 Ill. App. 378, 73 N.E.2d 331 (1947).
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 Santa Rosa-Vallejo Tanning Co. v. C. Kronauer & Co., 228 Ill. App. 236 (1923).
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the Code expands the scope of express warranties arising there-
under to include a sale by description.13 Such a description need
not be made by mere words, because technical specifications, blue
prints and the like can afford more exact descriptions than mere
language,8 4 and if made part of the basis of the bargain must con-
form to them. The rationale of a sale by description as an express
warranty under the Code, and the improvement it makes in Illinois
warranty law, is that the contract identifies what the seller must
deliver to satisfy the contract he has made; he must deliver the
thing which he has described. The significance of a description as
an express warranty in a contract of sale is apparent when viewed
in conjunction with Code section 2-316(1) which provides that
words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty
and words and conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall
be construed whenever reasonable as consistent with each other.
A description in a contract of sale as an express warranty will not
be subject to exclusion under the provisions of Code section 2-316
on exclusion and modification of warranties. It would seem to be
the height of inconsistency to permit a seller to insert a description
in a contract of sale and then permit him to avoid its obligation as
a warranty by routine use of words in the fine print of a contract
form. Of course descriptions by merchants must be read against the
applicable trade usages, with the general rules of merchantability
resolving any doubt.8 5
Sale by Model or Sample
In Illinois pre-Code law a sale by sample is equivalent to a
warranty that the sample is a true representative of the goods,8
and in every sale by sample there is an implied warranty that the
bulk of the goods shall be equal to, or correspond with, the sample
in quality.87 This principle is incorporated into section 16 of the
Sales Act, whereby it is provided that in case of a contract to sell
or a sale by sample there is an implied warranty that the bulk cor-
respond with the sample in quality.8 8 Furthermore, under section
83 I.C.C. § 2-313(l)(b).
84 U.C.C. Off. Com. § 2-313 point 5.
85 Ibid.
86 Spring v. Slayden-Kirksey Woolen Mills, 106 Il1. App. 579 (1902).
87 Central Commercial Co. v. The Lehon Co., 173 Ill. App. 27 (1912).
88 I.S.A. § 16.
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16(c) of. the Sales Act, if the seller is a dealer in goods of that kind,
on a sale by sample there is an implied warranty that the goods
will be free from any defect rendering them unmerchantable
which would not be apparent on a reasonable examination of the
sample.89
In order that such warranties may exist and be enforced under
the Sales Act, the requirements and conditions necessary in order
that the transaction may be truly a sale by sample must be present 0
The chief reason for exempting sales by sample from the cardinal
rule of caveat emptor is that the buyer has no chance to protect
himself by an examination of the commodity sold, and hence, when
the goods are in the presence of the parties at the time of the sale,
and an adequate examination can be made, even if it is inconven-
ient or difficult, the sale is not regarded as a sale by sample in the
absence of an express agreement to that effect.91
The implied warranties, of necessity, apply only where the
specific article bought was either not in existence or not on hand at
the time and place of the sale 92 and where the buyer has ample
opportunity to examine and inspect for himself there is no sale by
sample raising the implied warranties under the Sales Act 3
Under section 16(b) of the Sales Act there is an implied war-
ranty that the buyer shall have a reasonable opportunity of com-
paring the bulk with the sample.9 4
Under the Code a sale by model or sample which becomes
part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty,95 and
the significance of the change from an implied warranty under the
Sales Act to an express warranty under the Code is comparable to
the change the Code effects in warranty in a sale by description as
set forth above.96 However, under the Code the basic situation is
89 People v. Western Picture Frame Co., 368 Ill. 336, 13 N.E.2d 958 (1938).
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
92 Grass v. Steinberg, supra n.79.
93 Ibid.
94 I.S.A. § 16(b) provides:
"There is an implied warranty that the buyer shall have a reasonable opportunity
of comparing the bulk with the sample, except so far as otherwise provided in
section 47(3)."
95 I.C.C. § 2-313(c).
96 U.C.C. Off. Com. § 2-313 point 5.
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no different affecting the true essence of the bargain when a model
or sample is used rather than descriptive words alone in the con-
tract. Code section 2-313(l)(c) includes both a sample actually
drawn from the bulk of the goods which is the subject matter of
the sale, and a model which is offered for inspection when the sub-
ject matter is not at hand and which has not been drawn from the
bulk of the goods.
Although underlying principles are unchanged by the Code,
the facts are often ambiguous and the question becomes: was the
thing shown as "illustrative" or as a "straight" sample? In general,
the presumption is that any sample or model, just as any affirma-
tion of fact, is intended to become part of the basis of the bargain.
But there is no escape from the question of fact. When the seller
exhibits a sample purported to be drawn from an existing bulk,
good faith, of course, requires that the sample be fairly drawn. But
in merchantile experience the mere exhibition of a "sample" does
not of itself show whether it is merely intended to "suggest" or to
"be" the character of the subject matter of the contract. The ques-
tion is whether the seller has so acted with reference to the sample
as to make him responsible that the whole shall have at least the
value shown by it. The circumstances will aid in answering this
question. If the sample has been drawn from the existing bulk, it
must be regarded as describing values of the goods contracted for
and hence part of the basis of the bargain unless it is accompanied
by an unmistakable denial of such responsibility. If, on the other
hand, a model of merchandise not on hand is offered, the mercan-
tile presumption that it has become a literal description of the sub-
ject matter is not so strong, and particularly so if modification on
the buyer's initiative impairs any feature of the model.9 7
Warranty of Title
Under the Sales Act, unless there is an intention to the con-
trary, there is an implied warranty on the part of the seller that he
has a right to sell goods, or will have a right to sell goods at the
time the property is to pass, that the buyer will enjoy quiet posses-
sion of the goods, and that the subject of the sale is free, at the time
of the sale, from any charge or encumbrance in favor of a third
97 U.C.C. Off. Corn. § 2-313 point 6.
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person not declared or known to the buyer before or at the time
when the contract of sale was made.98 This was substantially the
rule stated in cases decided prior to the enactment of the Sales
Act.99 Further, no warranties of title under the Sales Act are im-
plied in sales by a sheriff, auctioneer, mortgagee or other person
professing to sell by virtue of authority in fact or law.100
Code section 2-312(1) restates the rules of the Sales Act, sec-
tion 13(1), (2), and (3) relevant to the warranty of title, but under
the Sales Act the warranty of title is an implied warranty, whereas
under the Code it is a statutory express warranty. Prior to the
Sales Act, this warranty arose only if the seller was in possession of
the goods at the time of the sale.' 0 '
As contained in Code section 2-312 the warranty of title has
been completely rewritten and improved by the addition of a pro-
vision concerning infringement. Sub-section 1 provides for a buy-
er's basic need in respect to a title which he in good faith expects
to acquire by his purchase, namely, that he receive a good, clean
title transferred to him in a rightful manner,10 2 so that he will not
be exposed to a lawsuit in order to protect it. The warranty extends
to a buyer whether or not the seller is in possession of the goods at
the time of the sale or contract of sale was made, since the knowl-
edge mentioned in Code section 2-312(l)(b) is by definition' 3 ac-
tual knowledge as distinct from notice. 1 4
The warranty of quiet possession of the Sales Act'0 5 is abol-
ished by the Code. Disturbance of quiet possession, however, al-
though not specifically mentioned, is one way, among many, in
which the breach of warranty of title may be shown.106
Although not enumerating specific classes of persons, as does
the Sales Act,' 7 the Code continues recognition that sales by sheriffs,
executors, forclosing lienors and persons similarly situated are so
out of the ordinary commercial course that their peculiar character
98 I.S.A. § 13.
99 Morris v. Thompson, 85 Ill. 16 (1877).
100 I.S.A. § 13(4).
101 Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Leidig, 64 Ill. 151 (1872).
102 Frank v. McCafferty Ford Co., 192 Pa. Super. 435, 161 A.2d 896 (1960).
103 I.C.C. § 1-201(25).
104 U.C.C. Off. Com. § 2-312 point 1.
105 I.S.A. § 13(2).
106 U.C.C. Off. Com. § 2-312 point 1.
107 I.S.A. § 13(4).
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should be apparent to the buyer, and therefore no personal obliga-
tion is imposed on the seller who is purporting to sell only an un-
known or limited right.'x8 The Code does not touch upon and
leaves open the question of restitution arising in such cases when an
article so sold is reclaimed by a third party as the rightful owner.'09
When the goods are part of a seller's normal stock and are sold
in the normal course of his business, it is his duty to see that no
claim of infringement of a patent or trademark by a third party
will mar the buyer's title. A sale, however, by a person other than
a dealer raises no implication in its circumstances of such a war-
ranty. Nor is there such an implication when the buyer orders
goods to be assembled, prepared or manufactured on his own
specifications. If, in such a case, the resulting product infringes a
patent or trademark, the liability will run from buyer to seller.
There is, under such circumstances, a tacit representation on the
part of the buyer that the seller will be safe in manufacturing ac-
cording to the specifications, and the buyer is under an obligation
in good faith to indemnify him for any loss suffered. 10
The principal significance of the change in the warranty of
title from an implied warranty under section 13 of the Sales Act to
an express warranty under section 2-312 of the Code is that in not
being so designated as an implied warranty, it is not subject to ex-
clusion or disclaimer under Code section 2-316(3). Disclaimer of
warranty of title, therefore, can only be accomplished by specific
language to the effect,"' circumstances which give the buyer reason
to know that the person selling does not claim title in himself,"2
or that he is purporting to sell only such right or title as he or a
third person may have." 3
IMPLIED WARRANTIES
Generally
Pre-Code Illinois law holds that implied warranties are im-
posed by law and do not arise from agreement of the parties," 4 and
108 U.C.C. Off. Com. § 2-312 point 5.
109 Ibid.
110 U.C.C. Off. Corn. § 2-312 point 3.
ill I.C.C. § 2-312(2).
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
114 MacAndrews & Forbes Co. v. Mechanical Mfg. Co., 367 Il1. 288, 11 N.E.2d 382
(1937).
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under the Sales Act various statutory implied warranties are con-
tained in every contract of sale unless expressly rejected by the
parties to the contract." 5 Warranties will not be implied in conflict
with the express terms of the sales agreement or contrary to the
manifest purpose of the parties where the facts clearly negative any
intention to warrant." 6
The presence of an express warranty does not necessarily pre-
vent the existence of an implied warranty; an express warranty does
not exclude implied warranties which are not inconsistent with it,
but it may exclude the implication of a warranty inconsistent there-
with." 7
The general policy of the Sales Act, followed by the Code, is
that warranties are created only by some conduct, (either by affirm-
ative acts or failure to disclose), on the part of the seller. There-
fore, all warranties are made cumulative unless this construction
of the contract is impossible or unreasonable." 8 Further, the basic
policy of the Sales Act, continued by the Code, is to recognize and
carry out sales agreements according to the intention of the parties.
The Sales Act provides no guide to aid in ascertaining the intent
of the parties when such intention is clouded by ambiguity, but
the Code lays down certain rules designed to aid in ascertaining
the intention of the parties as to which of inconsistent warranties
which have arisen from the circumstances of their transaction shall
prevail. The Code establishes an order of priority as between
warranties which are inconsistent.119
The rule of caveat emptor applies, in the absence of fraud
or express warranty, to all contracts of sale of personal property
where the buyer has equal and available means and opportunity
for examination or inspection of the property purchased,'120 and
under section 15(3) of the Sales Act, if the buyer has examined
the goods there is no implied warranty concerning defects which
such an examination ought to have revealed.'' Accordingly, with
115 Charles v. Judge & Dolph, Ltd., 11l F. Supp. 794 (N.D. Ill. 1953).
116 Sterling-Midland Coal Co. v. Great Lakes Coal & Coke Co., 334 111. 281, 165 N.E.
793 (1929).
117 Hover v. Colonial-Premier Co., 316 Ill. App. 453, 45 N.E.2d 201 (1942).
118 U.C.C. Off. Com. § 2-317 point 1.
119 I.C.C. § 2-317(a)(b)(c).
120 Mayer v. Bar Steels Co., 340 Il1. App. 414, 91 N.E.2d 455 (1950).
121 Bansbach v. Allied Mach. & Welding Co., 334 Ill. App. 76, 78 N.E.2d 344 (1948).
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reference to those characteristics or defects of property which are
obvious or discoverable by ordinary examination, it is the general
rule that no implied warranty exists where the parties deal at arms
length and there has been an inspection or test of the property
prior to the sale, in the absence of fraud or justifiable reliance on
the seller by the buyer,'2 and the opportunity to inspect, or the
availability of the goods for inspection or test, prior to the sale
will prevent the implication of warranties with respect thereto
even though no test or inspection is actually made,123 at least where
the seller resorts to no artifice to prevent the examination.12 4 How-
ever, the doctrine of caveat emptor does not apply, and implied
warranties are not precluded with respect to defects which are not
discoverable on a reasonable inspection. 125
The application of the doctrine of caveat emptor in all cases
where the buyer examines the goods regardless of statements made
by the seller is modified by the Code. Thus, if the offer of exam-
ination is accompanied by words of their merchantability or spe-
cific attributes and the buyer indicates clearly that he is relying on
those words rather than his examination, they give rise to an "ex-
press warranty." It would be a question of fact as to whether a
warranty of merchantability has been expressly incorporated into
the agreement. On the other hand, the wording of section 2-
3 16(3)(b) that the buyer "has refused to examine the goods" would
imply a demand that the buyer examine the good fully to put him
on notice that he assumes the risk of defects which the examina-
tion ought to reveal.
The particular buyer's skill and the normal method of ex-
amining goods in the circumstances will determine what defects
are excluded by the examination. A professional buyer examining
a product in his field will be held to have assumed the risk as to
all defects which a professional in his field ought to observe, while
a non-professional buyer will be held to assume the risk only for
such defects as a layman might be expected to observe. A failure
to notice defects which are obvious will not excuse a buyer, al-
122 Grass v. Steinberg, 331 111. App. 378, 73 N.E.2d 331 (1947).
123 Bansbach v. Allied Mach. & Welding Co., supra n.121.
124 Telluride Power Transmission Co. v. Crane Co., 208 Ill. 218, 70 N.E. 319 (1904).
125 Stanton v. Shakofsky, 2 Ill. App. 2d 527, 119 N.E.2d 812 (1954).
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though he is not chargeable with detecting latent defects which his
examination could not reasonably be expected to reveal. 126
Quality or Condition of Goods
The general rules applicable to express warranties apply to
express warranties of quality,'- and an affirmation of quality
amounting to a warranty must appear to have been made at the
time of the sale with the intention of warranting the quality and
not as a mere expression of opinion.28
Ordinarily, at common law, there was no implied warranty
of quality by a seller who was not the manufacturer. 129 The Sales
Act provides for implied warranties of quality under certain cir-
cumstances, 130 and under the provisions of the Sales Act implied
warranties of quality are limited, although the Sales Act effected
a change in the law by abolishing the distinction between ordinary
sellers and sellers who are manufacturers.''
Where an article is sold without an express warranty and is
tested by the buyer, any implied warranty of quality does not
extend beyond the dates of acceptance and use by the buyer. 3 2
Limited under the Sales Act, implied warranties are divided
into two principal types under the Code: fitness for a particular
purpose, and merchantability and usage of trade. They will be dis-
cussed in that order.
Fitness for a Particular Purpose
In Illinois pre-Code law there was an express warranty of fit-
ness, as in the case of a representation by the seller of fitness for
a particular purpose on which the buyer relied. 13 3 Such warranty
was broken, no matter what the general quality might have been,
if the article was not, in fact, suitable for the purpose specified. 34
126 U.C.C. Off. Com. § 2-316 point 8; Ehert Brewery v. Lebanon Valley Brewing Co.,
5 Pa. Lebanon 125 (1955).
127 Keller v. Flynn, 346 Ill. App. 499, 105 N.E.2d 532 (1952).
128 Ibid.
129 Peoria Grape-Sugar Co. v. Turney, 175 Ill. 631, 51 N.E. 587 (1898).
130 I.S.A. § 15.
131 77 C.J.S. Sales § 329 (1952).
132 Allied Beauty Products Mfg. Co. v. Chemical Borings Co. of America, 331 Ill. App.
112, 72 N.E.2d 451 (1947).
133 Burke v. Instant Heat Co. of America, 236 Ill. App. 275 (1925).
134 Dickey v. Ghere, 163 Ill. App. 641 (1911).
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Furthermore, whether or not the seller was a grower or manu-
facturer, an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose
would arise if the goods were purchased for a particular purpose
which was known to the seller, expressly or by implication, and the
buyer relied on the skill or judgment of the seller to furnish such
goods.135
Prior to the adoption of the Uniform Sales Act, which modi-
fied the former law, 136 the rule was that if an article was to be made
or supplied to the order of a purchaser, there was an implied war-
ranty of fitness of the article for the special purpose designed by
the buyer, if that purpose was known to the seller,'3 7 but in the
sale of an existing article there was not, in the absence of fraud,
any implied warranty of good quality, condition, or fitness for the
purpose intended. 3 8
An implied warranty that the goods sold are fit for the par-
ticular purpose will not arise if the seller is not informed of, or
expressly or impliedly acquainted with such purpose, or the buyer
does not rely on the seller's skill and judgment. 3 9
Although it is an unusual situation, under certain circum-
stances an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose may
arise in the sale of second hand goods. 4 °
Under Code section 2-315,141 whether or not an implied war-
ranty of fitness for a particular purpose arises is basically a ques-
tion of fact to be determined by the circumstances of the con-
tracting. Nor is it necessary that the buyer actually inform the
seller of the particular purpose for which the goods are intended
or of his reliance on the seller's skill and judgment if the circum-
stances are such that the seller has to realize the purpose intended
or that the reliance exists. The buyer, of course, must actually
be relying on the seller. 42
135 Spero Elec. Corp. v. Wilson, 330 Ill. App. 622, 71 N.E.2d 827 (1947).
136 Mandel Bros. v. Mulvey, 230 Ill. App. 588 (1923).
137 Telluride Power Transmission Co. v. Crane Co., 208 I1. 218, 70 N.E. 319 (1904).
138 Ibid.
139 Sampson v. Marra, 343 Ill. App. 245, 98 N.E.2d 523 (1951).
140 Markman v. Hallbeck, 206 I1. App. 465 (1917).
141 De Graff v. Myers Foods, Inc., 19 Pa. D. & C.2d 19 (1958) held: "This Code sub-
stantially continues the implied warranty of fitness of purpose contained in the (Uniform)
Sales Act, § 15(1)."
142 U.C.C. Off. Com. § 2-315 point 1; Crotty v. Shartenberg's-New Haven, 147 Conn.
460, 162 A.2d 513 (1960).
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A "particular purpose" differs from the ordinary purpose for
which the goods are used in that it envisages a specific use by the
buyer which is peculiar to the nature of his business, whereas the
ordinary purpose for which goods are used are those envisaged in
the concept of merchantability and go to uses which are custom-
arily made of the goods in question. For example, shoes are gen-
erally used for the purpose of walking upon ordinary ground, but
a seller may know that a particular pair of shoes was selected to
be used for climbing mountains. 4 3
A contract may, of course, include both a warranty of mer-
chantability and one of fitness for a particular purpose, and any
question of inconsistency between or among express or implied
warranties will necessarily be resolved under the provisions of
Code section 2-317 on "Cumulation and Conflict of Warranties
Express or Implied." In such a case any question of fact as to
which warranty was intended by the parties to apply must be re-
solved in favor of the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose
as against all other warranties except where the buyer has taken
upon himself the responsibility of furnishing the technical speci-
fications. 44
The absence from Code section 2-315 of the language used in
section 15(1) of the Sales Act in referring to the seller "whether
he be the grower or manufacturer or not" is not intended to im-
pose any requirement that the seller be a grower or manufacturer.
Although normally the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose
will arise only where the seller is a merchant with the appropriate
"skill or judgment," it can arise as to nonmerchants where this is
justified by the particular circumstances. 145
The common law rule, adopted by the Sales Act, is that if a
specific article, or one known, defined, and described, 146 or one
known under a patent or trade name,'147 is ordered and furnished
143 U.C.C. Off. Com. § 2-315 point 2; Whiting Corp. v. Process Engineering, Inc., 273
F.2d 742 (1st Cir. 1960).
144 U.C.C. Off. Corn. § 2-315 point 2. Royal Pioneer Paper Box Mfg. Co. v. Louis
De Jonge & Co., 179 Pa. Super. 155, 115 A.2d 837 (1955) (buyer specifies quality of goods
and gives exact specifications).
145 U.C.C. Off. Com. § 2-315 point 4.
146 Frost v. Van Cleef, 291 111. App. 363, 9 N.E.2d 977 (1937).
147 Beckett v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 376 Ill. 470, 34 N.E.2d 427 (1941).
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there is no implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose,
since the buyer receives what he bargained for. This rule applies
even though the seller knows or is informed of such purpose. 148
In certain cases a sale may not constitute a sale by patent or trade
name so as to exclude a warranty of fitness. 49
The elimination of the "patent or other trade name" excep-
tion of Sales Act section 15(4) constitutes a major extension of the
warranty of fitness in the Code. Under the Code the existence of
a patent or other trade name and the designation of the article
by that name, or indeed in any other definite manner, is only one
of the facts to be considered on the question of whether the buyer
actually relied on the seller, but it is not decisive of the issue. II
the buyer himself insists on a particular brand he is not relying
on the seller's skill and judgment and so no warranty results. But
the mere fact that the article purchased has a particular patent or
trade name is not sufficient to indicate nonreliance if the article
has been recommended by the seller as adequate for the buyer's
purpose. 150
Despite reliance on the seller's skill and judgment by the
buyer, a seller may still disclaim or modify the warranty of "fitness
for a particular purpose" under Code section 2-316(2) in a given
case or transaction. However, such disclaimer or modification
must be in writing and conspicuous. 151
Merchantability
The general rules applicable to express warranties apply to
express warranties of merchantability, 152 and under the Sales Act,
where the goods are bought by description from a seller who deals
148 Elevator Safety Device Co. v. Brown-Ketcham Iron Works, 153 Ill. App. 313 (1910).
149 Spero Elec. Corp. v. Wilson, 330 Ill. App. 622, 71 N.E.2d 827 (1947) (catalogue
description of goods "government type" raised an implied warranty the goods conformed
to government requirements, and was not a trade name which would exclude warranty
of fitness); Lathrop-Paulson Co. v. Perksen, 229 Ill. App. 400 (1923) (sale of bottle washing
machine described as "Rotary Bottle Washer," held, descriptive words are of general
application [no trade name]).
150 U.C.C. Off. Com. § 2-315 point 5.
151 I.C.C. § 2-316 provides: "(2) . . . and to exclude or modify any implied warranty
of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous. Language to exclude all
implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that . . . 'There are no
warranties which extend beyond the description on the face hereof."' Accord: Rustyk
Products Co. v. Rotenberger, 73 Pa. Montg. 519 (1959).
152 Luthy v. Waterbury, 140 Ill. 664, 30 N.E. 351 (1892).
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in goods of that description, whether or not he is the grower or
manufacturer, there is an implied warranty that the goods are of
merchantable quality.1 53 The implied warranty of merchantability
under the Sales Act does not apply where there is no sale by
description,'1 4 and where there is a sale under a patent or trade
name it has been stated that there is no implied warranty of mer-
chantability.'55 It is possible also to disclaim or exclude the im-
plied warranty of merchantability by contract. 56
Code section 2-314(1) provides:
Unless excluded or modified (section 2-316), a warranty
that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a con-
tract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect
to goods of that kind. Under this section the serving for
value of food or drink to be consumed either on the
premises or elsewhere is a sale.
As thus rewritten, the implied warranty of merchantability repre-
sents a significant change in Illinois warranty law. Undefined un-
der the Sales Act, the warranty of merchantability was imposed on
the seller only in sales by description 1" or sample. 58 As defined
under the Code, the warranty of merchantability is broad and com-
prehensive, but not so rigid as to frustrate future development,
since sub-sections (2)(a) through (f) provides for minimal require-
ments only. 59 Further evidence of intent to expand rather than
limit warranty obligation under the Code is found in 2-314(3),
which provides: "Unless excluded or modified (section 2-316)
other implied warranties may arise from course of dealing or
usage of trade." Thus, the parties may contract, unless specifically
excluded, with respect to course of dealing or trade usage with
respect to merchantability of goods, or impose a higher standard
of merchantability by their own agreement.
Under the Code the warranty of merchantability arises when
the seller is a merchant who sells regularly the kind of goods in
153 I.S.A. § 15(2).
'54 People v. Western Picture Frame Co., 368 Il1. 336, 13 N.E.2d 958 (1938).
'55 Santa Rosa-Vallejo Tanning Co. v. Charles Kronauer & Co., 228 Ill. App. 236
(1923).
156 Alex J. Mandl, Inc. v. San Roman, 170 F.2d 839 (7th Cir. 1948).
157 I.S.A. § 15(2).
158 I.S.A. § 16(c).
159 U.C.C. Off. Com. § 2-314 point 6.
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question,16 and it is immaterial whether he is a manufacturer or
grower of such goods.' The seller's obligation applies to present
sales as well as contracts of sale, subject to the effects of any exam-
ination of specified goods, 6 2 and the warranty of merchantability
will, under the Code, apply to sales for resale as well as sale for
use.6 3 Although a seller may not be a "merchant" as to the goods
in question, if he states generaily that the goods are "guaranteed"
the provisions of Code section 2-314 may furnish a guide to the
content of the resulting express warranty. This has particular sig-
nificance in the case of second hand sales, and has further signifi-
cance in limiting the effect of fine-print disclaimer clauses where
their effect would be inconsistent with large-print assertions of
"guarantee."'"
The question when the warranty of merchantability is im-
posed under the Code turns basically on the meaning of the terms
of the agreement as recognized in the trade. Goods delivered under
an agreement made by a merchant in a given line of trade must
be of a quality comparable to that generally acceptable in that
line of trade under the description or other designation of the
goods in the agreement. The responsibility imposed rests on any
merchant-seller, and the absence of the words "grower or manu-
facturer or not" which appears in section 15(2) of the Sales Act
will not restrict the applicability of this section (2-314 of the
Code).65
Of the basic minimum elements of the warranty of merchant-
ability to be found in Code, section 2-314(2), paragraphs (a) and
(b), should be read together. Both refer to the standards of that
line of the trade which fits the transaction and the seller's business.
"Fair average" is a term directly appropriate to agricultural bulk
products and means goods centering around the middle belt of
160 I.C.C. § 2-314(1).
161 U.C.C. Off. Com. § 2-314 point 2. Accord: Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super.
422, 156 A.2d 568 (1960) (person who, after purchase of a thing, injured because of unfit-
ness for the intended purpose may sue the manufacturer in assumpsit on breach of implied
warranty of fitness, and proof of contractual relationship or privity between manufacturer
and buyer is not necessary).
162 U.C.C. Off. Com. § 2-314 point 1.
163 Ibid.
164 U.C.C. Off. Com. § 2-314 point 4.
165 U.C.C. Off. Com. § 2-314 point 2; Goepfert v. Town Motors Automotive Co., I
Pa. Bucks 134 (1955) (implied warranties may apply to a sale of a secondhand automobile).
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quality, not the least or the worst that can be understood in the
particular trade by the designation, but such as can pass "without
objection." A fair percentage of the least is permissible but the
goods are not "fair average" if they are all of the least or worst
quality possible under the description.1 66
Fitness for the ordinary purpose 167 for which goods of the type
purchased are used, as opposed to the warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose as found in Code section 2-315, is a basic fun-
damental of the warranty of merchantability as found in the Code.
Merchantability or fitness for the "ordinary purpose" is an essen-
tial part of the obligation which the buyer owes to a purchaser
for use. However, limitation to the "ordinary purpose" excludes
the applicability of the warranty to the hypersensitive or allergic
buyer. Moreover, protection under this aspect of the warranty
of the person buying for resale to the ultimate consumer is equally
necessary, and merchantable goods must therefore be "honestly"
resalable in the normal course of business because they are what
they purport to be.6 8 Breach of the warranty of merchantability
is the basis of many tort remedies, and where fitness for the ordi-
nary purpose for which the goods are intended is the breach com-
plained of, proof of privity of contract is not essential to mainte-
nance of the action by the injured party. 16 9
Paragraph (d) of Code section 2-314(2), concerning evenness
of kind, quality and quantity, follows case law and refers to per-
missive variations of quality within certain accepted limits as es-
tablished by the agreement or usage of trade. Precautionary lan-
guage, however, is inserted as a reminder of the frequent usages
of trade which permit substantial variations both with and with-
out an obligation to replace the varying units.170
Paragraph (e) of section 2-314(2) which provides: "... are
adequately contained, packaged and labeled as the agreement may
require," applies where the nature of the goods and of the trans-
action require a certain type of container, package or label. Para-
166 U.C.C. Off. Corn. § 2-314 point 7.
167 I.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c).
168 U.C.C. Off. Com. § 2-314 point 8.
169 Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1960).
170 U.C.C. Off. Corn. § 2-314 point 9.
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graph (f), on the other hand, applies wherever there is a label
or container on which representations are made, even though the
original contract, either by express terms or usage of trade, may
not have required either the labeling or the representation. This
follows from the general obligation of good faith which requires
that a buyer should not be placed in a position of reselling or
using goods delivered under false representations appearing on
the package or container.' 71
Subsection (3) of section 2-314 makes it implicit that usage
of trade and course of dealing can create warranties, but that they
are implied rather than express warranties and thus subject to
modification or exclusion under Code section 2-316. Exclusion of
the warranty of merchantability will be treated in the following
paragraphs on disclaimer and waiver of warranty.
The Code now puts to rest any dispute that a sale of food is
within the scope of Article 2 on sales. Under pre-code law, there
was an implied warranty that food sold to the public was fit for
consumption' 72 and under the Sales Act, section 15, at least where
the sale of the food is for immediate consumption, there is an im-
plied warranty that the food is wholesome and fit for human con-
sumption. 73 The immediate seller makes such a warranty at the
time the food is purchased by the consumer,174 and such warranty
has been held applicable to sales by retailers of goods which are
canned, bottled, or. in a sealed package. 75 It has been held, how-
ever, that the implied warranty of wholesomeness of food does not
attach to the container itself, so as to render a retail dealer liable
for a defect in the container which caused an eye injury when
an attempt was made to open such container. 176
The implied warranty of fitness of food for human consump-
tion applies to a manufacturer, canner, bottler, or processor of
food products for sale to the public. 77 Such warranty is made
171 U.C.C. Off. Corn. § 2-314 point 10.
172 Sharpe v. Danville Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 9 Ill. App. 2d 175, 132 N.E.2d 442
(1956).
173 Wiedeman v. Keller, 171 Ill. 93, 49 N.E. 210 (1897).
174 Sharpe v. Danville Coca-Cola Bottling Co., supra n.172.
175 Ibid.
176 Crandall v. Stop & Shop, 288 Ill. App. 543, 6 N.E.2d 685 (1937).
177 Sharpe v. Danville Coca-Cola Bottling Co. supra n.172.
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when the food leaves the control of the manufacturer, canner,
bottler, or processor, 178 and runs with the sale of the article for
the benefit of the consumer. 179 However, since the product may
pass through many person's hands before it reaches the ultimate
consumer, public policy does not require anyone selling the prod-
uct to warrant that no one will tamper with or adulterate the
product before it comes into the hands of the ultimate consumer
and after it leaves the hands of the seller. 80
Application of the warranty of fitness applies to food only
when it has been prepared in an acceptable manner. Pork, gen-
erally fit to be eaten only when properly cooked, is not warranted
for fitness for consumption when eaten raw or cooked in an un-
usual or improper manner.' 8' Disclaimer of the warranty of fitness
or quality may be against public policy. However, where the con-
tainer is damaged, a sale of the product "as is, no recourse" was
held to negative the warranty that cans and contents would be
fit for resale and for ultimate human consumption.8 2
The warranty of wholesomeness in the serving of food by a
restaurant keeper is recognized and applied since he is in much
the same position as a retail dealer in food with respect to the
food he serves to his customers.83 The proprietor of the eating
place will be liable for his breach of warranty, whether or not he
was negligent. 184
The serving for value of food or drink to be consumed on
the premises or elsewhere is a sale'85 under the Code. The prin-
cipal warranty is found in Code section 2-314(l)(c), that the goods
(food), to be merchantable, must be fit for the normal purpose
for which such goods are used. This should have the effect of
adding the remedy of breach of the warranty of merchantability to
the existing remedy for breach of the warranty of wholesomeness
in cases of sales of food for human consumption. It has been held
178 Ibid.
179 Patargias v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, 332 Ill. App. 117, 74 N.E.2d 162
(1947).
180 Williams v. Paducah Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 343 Ill. App. 1, 98 N.E.2d 164 (1951).
181 77 C.J.S., Sales, § 331 (1952).
182 Garofalo Co. v. St. Marys Packing Co., 339 Ill. App. 412, 90 N.E.2d 292 (1950).
183 Duncan v. Martin's Restaurant, 347 Ill. App. 183, 106 N.E.2d 731 (1952).
184 Ibid.
185 I.C.C. § 2-314(1).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
under the Code that a glass container was subject to the implied
warranty of fitness and merchantability although only milk, and
not the container, was sold; 86 and that evidence that the container
was not mishandled and evidence relating to the manner in which
the container shattered were questions for the jury as to whether





Express warranties arise out of the negotions leading to the
final agreement between the parties and are, therefore, a part of
the contract. 8 Implied warranties, on the other hand, are not
promissory in their nature but are imposed by law'8 9 for the pro-
tection of buyers or to improve marketing conditions. But war-
ranties are not essential to the existence of a contract,'9 ° and in
Illinois pre-Code law implied warranties may be expressly ex-
cluded by the terms of the contract of sale, and such terms are
valid. 91 The warranty exclusionary right may be exercised under
the provisions of section 71 of the Sales Act, and the provisions
of that section of the Sales Act have been held to be declaratory
of the common law. 192 A complete negation of an implied war-
ranty occurs where there exists any words or conduct tending to
show that such was the intention of the parties. 93 Sales of prop-
erty "as is" generally exclude implied warranties. 94
Freedom of contract is a declared principle of the Code and
the parties may, by agreement, determine the standards by which,
the performance of their obligations under their contracts are to
be measured subject to the requirement of good faith in their
dealings. 9 While the Sales Act failed to codify the rules of dis-
claimer, the Code, on the other hand, devotes a whole section to
186 Hadley v. Hillcrest Dairy, Inc., 341 Mass. 624, 171 N.E.2d 293 (1961).
187 Ibid.
188 Paul Harris Furniture Co. v. Morse, supra n.12.
189 Beckett v. F. W. Woolworth Co., supra n.13.
190 Sterling-Midland Coal Co. v. Great Lakes Coal & Coke Co., supra n.18.
191 Alex J. Mandi, Inc. v. San Roman, 170 F.2d 839 (7th Cir. 1949).
192 Ibid.
193 Ibid.
194 Garofalo v. St. Marys Packing Co., 339 Ill. App. 412, 90 N.E.2d 292 (1950).
195 I.C.C. § 1-102(3).
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this purpose, and contains many provisions which tend to protect
an unwary and inexperienced buyer against the tactics of a "sharp"
seller in his avoidance of warranty obligations in a contract. This
policy of the Code is aptly stated by a Pennsylvania court in the
case of L. & N. Sales Co. v. Little Brown Jug, Inc.,198 in which
the court said:
The provision for the exclusion of warranties must be
interpreted in a manner consistent with the general pur-
pose of the code to promote fair dealings in business
transactions.
In order to carry out this policy in sales transactions the sections
of the Code relating to warranties have been rewritten as com-
pared with the language used in the Sales Act, and realigned, in
that many warranties formerly designated as implied warranties
in the Sales Act are express warranties under the Code.197 The
more restrictive rules of the Code for disclaimer of warranty and
the resulting improvement in warranty protection in sales trans-
actions under the Code are discussed in the paragraphs immedi-
ately following.
The warranty of title as found in the Sales Act' 98 is designated
as an implied warranty, whereas in the Code'" the existence of
such a warranty is indicated by the use of the word "warranty"
alone.20 0 Since it is not designated as an implied warranty, the
warranty of title of the Code is not subject to exclusion under
Code section 2-316. Successful modification or exclusion of the
warranty of title can be accomplished only by compliance with
the circumstance or language requirement of Code section 2-
312(2).20 The "warranty" obligation against infringement as
found in subsection (3) of section 2-312 is likewise free from the
effects of Code section 2-316 on the exclusion of implied warran-
196 12 Pa. D. & C.2d 469 (1959).
197 For specific detail, see the categories above designated "express" and "implied"
warranties.
198 I.S.A. § 13.
199 I.C.C. § 2-312.
200 I.C.C. § 2-312(1).
201 Section 2-312(2) provides: "A warranty under subsection (1) will be excluded or
modified only by specific language or by circumstances which give the buyer reason to
know that the person selling does not claim title in himself or that he is purporting to
sell only such right or title as he or a third person may have."
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ties. The warranty against infringement, which arises only in case
of a sale by "a merchant who deals in goods of the kind ' 20 2 in-
volved in the transaction can be excluded or modified only by
agreement of the parties but, unlike the exclusion of the warranty
of title, "circumstances" to modify or exclude this warranty must
be such as to be a part of the agreement. 203
Subject to certain exceptions such as: (1) terms in a contract
which in ordinary commercial usage are understood to mean that
the buyer takes the entire risk as to the quality of the goods (terms
"as is"; "with all faults," etc.)20 4 (2) when the buyer before en-
tering into the contract has examined the goods or sample or
model, or has refused to examine the goods,20 5 and (3) by course
of dealing or usage of trade,206 and limitation on the remedy for
breach of warranty,207 in order to modify or exclude the implied
warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language used
must mention merchantability, and in case of a written obligation
the exclusionary language must be written in a conspicuous man-
ner.
208
Unlike the implied warranty of merchantability, implied
warranties of fitness may be excluded by general language pro-
vided the exclusionary language is in writing and "conspicuous. "209
A written statement such as "there are no warranties which extend
beyond the description on the face hereof" is adequate for the
purpose.2 10 All implied warranties of fitness may be excluded,
whether it be fitness for a particular purpose, or fitness for the
ordinary purpose (as found in the implied warranty of merchant-
ability211) by specific language addressed thereto or the general
language excluding all warranties.
Additional evidence of Code policy to protect the existence
202 I.C.C. § 2-312(3)
203 I.C.C. § 2-312(3) provides: "'Unless otherwise agreed' a seller who is a merchant."
204 I.C.C. § 2-316(3)(a).
205 I.C.C. § 2-316(3)(b).
206 I.C.C. § 2-316(3)(c).
20T I.C.C. § 2-316(4).
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of warranty obligations in a contract of sale is to be found in
section 2-316(1) which provides:
Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express
warranty and words or conduct tending to negate or limit
warranty shall be construed whenever reasonable as con-
sistent with each other; but subject to the provisions of
this article on parol or extrinsic evidence (section 2-202)
negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent that
such construction is unreasonable.
and in section 2-317 which provides:
Warranties whether express or implied shall be con-
strued as consistent with each other and as cumulative,
but if such construction is unreasonable the intention of
the parties shall determine which warranty is dominant.
In ascertaining that intention,
Code policy favoring the existence of warranty obligation is fur-
ther evidenced in section 2-318 whereby the benefits of warranty
protection are extended to include certain third party benefici-
aries. However, this section should not be considered to be a
total abandonment of the doctrine of privity of contract since the
class of person within its protection is limited.212
CONCLUSION
As succintly stated in the Illinois Annotations to the Uniform
Commercial Code, compiled by the Illinois Uniform State Law
Commission, under the heading of Reasons for the Code, "It (the
Code) is not revolutionary but on the other hand it modernizes
the law of [commercial transactions] in the light of the experience
of over half a century of unprecedented commercial growth since
four of our major acts [uniform laws] were promulgated." The
law of warranty in sales transactions shares to a great degree the
modernizing effect of the Code on Illinois commercial law. The
warranty provisions of the Code on sales as found in Article 2
rewrite and revise comparable provisions of the Sales Act and
212 Section 2-318 provides: "A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends
to any "natural" person who is in the "family or household" of his buyer or who is a
"guest" in his home if it is reasonable that such person may use, consume or be affected
by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty .... "
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effect many, many changes and improvements. The scope of ex-
press warranty has been expanded to include sale by description,
model and sample as well as sale by promise or affirmation of fact.
Warranty of title becomes a statutory (express) warranty rather
than an implied warranty, with the added provisions of warranty
protection against infringement. The implied warranty of mer-
chantability is clearly defined, yet remains flexible enough in defi-
nition to permit future expansion and development of its appli-
cation. Greater consumer-purchaser protection seems assured
through clarification of the troublesome status of disclaimer of
warranty. In cases of warranty of title, exclusions will require
specific language or circumstances to effect it. Warranty against
infringement will be excluded only by agreement, and circum-
stances that will exclude this warranty must be such as will be
regarded as part of such agreement. To exclude the implied war-
ranty of merchantability, except for certain specific exceptions, and
the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, specific
language requirements exist, and when written, such words of
exclusion must be conspicuous. Rules are added to ascertain in-
tention of the parties as to which is the dominant warranty where
warranties conflict, and warranty protection, in appropriate situa-
tions, is extended to designated third party beneficiaries. The
Code does not purport to answer all questions involved in com-
mercial transactions, but its provisions are not so rigid as to pre-
clude future expansion and development of commercial law in
Illinois. The official comment to the Uniform Cemmercial Code
will serve as a valuable guide to courts solving judicial problems
of commercial law arising under the Code, and where problems
arise outside the scope of the Code, courts should be guided in
policy making decisions relating thereto by the signposts of general
commercial policy to be found in the Code.
